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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Third District Court, Summit County 
entered on November 25,2003, District Court Case No. 95-46-0015S. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Issue Number One 
I. Issue: Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction, Utah Codes Ann, 78-45c-202 
The District Court committed an error of Utah and UCCJEA law of due process, by 
not acknowledging that Utah has a non-uniformed UCA 202 statute, by relinquish 
jurisdiction under false pretense, by discriminated against a Utah citizen, t>y failure to 
prioritize facts, and by ignoring jurisdictional evidentiary standards. 
H Issue Number Two 
II. Issue: Simultaneous Proceedings, Utah Codes Ann. 78-45c-206 
The Third District Court committed an error of Utah and UCCJEA law of due process, 
by ignoring and/or the failure to act upon the Petitioners/Appellee^ s unjustifiable conduct 
of creating "Simultaneous Proceedings" in two jurisdiction as the same time. 
Ill Issue Number Three 
III. Issue: Inconvenient Porum, Utah Codes Ann. 78-45c-207 
The Third District Court committed an error of Utah and UCCJEA law by not 
conforming to the UCCJEA chapter regarding due process, and by not using 
jurisdictional evidentiary standards. 
IV Issue Number Four 
IV. Issue: Communication Between Courts, UCA 78-45c-llt) 
The Third District Court committed an error of Utah and UCCJEA law by not 
1 
conforming to the UCCJEA due process protocol, by failure to notice a person outside 
the state of an ex-parte hearing was and/or had taking place, by not allowing the 
Respondent/Appellant an opportunity to be heard after said ex-parte hearing before his 
final ruling and order of this case. 
V Issue Number Five 
V, Issue: Jurisdiction Declined By Reason Of Conduct, Utah Codes Ann. 78-45c-208 
The Third District Court failed to acknowledge and/or act upon as a matter of Utah 
and UCCJEA law the Petitioners/Appellee's multiple acts of bad faith, unjustifiable 
conduct, and total disregards of UCCJEA due process and evidentiary standards. 
Standard of Review 
Standard of review: this applicable standard of appellate UCCJEA review has been 
shepardize in all fifty states, including the current 38 states that have enacted UCCJEA, 
and for accuracy, the old UCCJA was not review (see addendum "a"). 
<M3NSTITIUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997), including the texts of 
the "Prefatory Note and Comments", build by the 6€National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws" (NCCUSL), and found at 
wwwJawMpenn.edu/bllulc/uccjea/finall997actMm. 
(see addendum "b") 
STATEMENT OETHE CASE 
a. Introduction, nature of the case; 
Respondent/Appellant is requesting relief in this mater that the Third District Court 
2 
erred in its Ming and order on entered on November 25, 2003, District Court Case No. 
95-46-00158. 
The Respondent/Appellant intend to show this Utah Appeal Court the nature of this 
case, as a matter of law, will be based on the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act <UCCJEA)(1997) drafted by flie National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) and by it approved and recommended 
for enactment in ^ 11 the states at its Annual conferenceMeeting in its Gne-Hundred-And 
-Sixth Year in Sacramento California July 25 - August 1,1997 with Prefatory Note and 
Comments and that was adopted and enacted hy the State of Utah in the year 2000 (see 
addendum "b"). 
Respondent/Appellant will show that the Third District Court committed multiple 
error of law listed in this brief as five (5) issues of statutory factors, and roughly fourteen 
(14) violations of UCCJEA andUtalfs UCA 7S-45c-101 chapter due process laws. 
Further showing that the Petitioner/Appellee unjustifiable conduct of filing this cases 
"Motion to Quash Service of Summons" was an act of bad faith, and the contributing 
factor to all violations the Respondent/Appellant's rights to due process of this case. 
b. course of proceedings; the relevant facts below indicate date and times of 
proceedings related to this case: 
June 30, 2003: Respondent/Appellant filed and mail service to Petitioner; Petition To 
Modify Decree of Divorce and Adoption of the Proposed Parenting Plan with the Third 
District Court of Summit County Utah. July 30,2003: Nancy Mismash, Attorney for 
the Petitioner, filed; Notice of appearance of Counsel, with the Third District Court of 
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Summit County Utah. August 6,2003: Petitioner/Appellee, filed Petition for 
Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule, 
Parenting Plan, with the Superior Court of the State of Washington for the County of 
King (see addendum "c"). August 11,2005: Petitioner filed a; Motion to Quash 
Service of Summons, and Memorandum in support of motion to Quash Service of 
Summons, with the Third District Court of Summit County Utah. August 11, 2003: 
Hearing took place, at the Third District Court of Summit County Utah, regarding 
Respondent's Motion for Temporary Relief (see addendum "d"). August 19, 
2003: Respondent filed a Motion for Extended Time to Answer Petitioners Motion to 
Quash Service of Summons, with the Third District Court of Summit County Utah. 
September 11, 2003: Respondent filed; Respondents Answer to Petitioners Motion to 
Quash Service of Summers, with the Third District Court of Summit County Utah 
(see addendum *e"). September 24,2003: Respondent filed a: Answers to 
Petitioners Petition for Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting 
Plan/Residential Schedule, Parenting Plan, with the Superior Court of the "State of 
Washington for the County of King. November 17,2003: The honorable Bruce C. 
Lubeck of the Third District Court contacted the Honorable Helen Halpert regarding "the 
off-the -record conversation. On November 18, 2003, that discussion was scheduled for 
November 24,2003." (see addendum "F). November 10,2003: Mr. Henry R. 
Hanssen, Jr., Washington State attorney for the Petitioner/Appellee, mailed an exclusive 
letter to the Honorable Helen L. Helpert, King County Superior Court, State of 
4 
Washington, regarding "Young Parenting Plan Proceeding, King County Superior Court 
Case No. 03-3-09663-0 SEA. November 21, 2003: Mr. Henry R. Hanssen, Jr., faxed the 
same letter to the Honorable Judge Bruce C. Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit 
County, Utah (see addendum *g"). November 24,2003: Hearing took place in the 
Third District Court of Summit County Utah for: Petitioner's motion to Quash, at 11:00 
a.m. November 24,2003: A Chambers/Telephonic hearing was held. Appearances 
where by the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit County Utah, 
appearing in Utah Chambers. The Honorable Helen L. Helpert, King County Superior 
Court, State of Washington, appearing Teleplionically"formWasMngton. And Mr. 
Hansen, Esquire of the Plaintiff (PetitioneiyAppellee) in Washington, also appearing 
Telephonically form Washington (see addendum T ) . November 75,2003: 
Third District Court of Summit County Utah, Ruling and Order were filed regarding: 
Petitioner's motion to Quash. November 25,2003: Third District Court of Summit 
County Utah, mailed the Ruling and Order to Honorable Judge Helen L. Halpert, 
Superior Court of the State of Washington for the County of King (see addendum 
"h"). December 8, 2©03r Respondent filed; Motion this Court To Reconsider its 
Ruling and Order Dated November 25, 2003, with the Third District Court of Summit 
County Utah, including their answer (addendum "i"). January 12; 2004: Respondent 
filed; Notice to Submit for Decision, RE: Respondents Motions This Court to Reconsider 
its Ruling and Order Dated November 25, 2003, with the Third District Court of Summit 
County Utah. January 12,2004: Third District Court of Summit County Utah: file if s 
Ruling and Order regarding Respondents; Notice to Submit for Decision, RE: 
5 
Respondents Motions This Court to Reconsider its Ruling and Order Dated November 
25, 2003. Febuary 11,-2004:' Respondent file; Notice of Appeal, and, Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity, with the Third District Court of Summit County Utah. Febuary 11,2004: 
Respondent filed a letter, Request for Transcripts, with the Third District Court of 
Summit County Utah. Febuary 11,2004: Third District Court of Summit County Utah: 
file its Ruling and Order Denying Respondents Affidavit of Impecuniosity. Febuary 19, 
2004: Respondent filed; Motion For Extended Time To File a Memorandum Challenging 
the Appeal Fee Assessments, with the Third District Court of Summit County Utah. 
March 2,2004: Respondent filed a second letter, Request for Transcripts, with the Third 
District Court of Summit County Utah. March 16, 2004: Respondent filed; 
Memorandum Challenging The Appeal fee Assessments, with the Third District Court of 
Summit County Utah. March 17, 2004: Third District Court of Summit County Utah: 
file it's Ruling and Order regarding Respondents; Approving Respondents Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity and the mailing of Respondents Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. March 19,2004: Utah Court of Appeals sent Respondent that 'the Notice of 
Appeal was now on file, and that the Respondent had 10 day to file his Docketing 
Statement Outline, and send a letter Requesting Transcripts. March 36,2004: 
Respondent filed a third letter, Request for Transcripts, with the Third District Court of 
Summit County Utah. March 29,2004: Respondent /Appellant: filed; Docketing 
Statement, with the Utah Court of Appeals. April 5,2004: Utah Court of Appeals sends 
a letter to Respondent / Appellant regarding the need for more information within the 
6 
Docketing Statement submitted on March 29,2004, and allowed 10 days to submit said 
information. June 21, 2004: Briefing Schedule set by Utah Court of Appeals. July 7, 
2004: Extension of time granted by Utah Court of Appeals, brief due date September 2, 
2004. 
c disposition at trial, None, or not available. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Please reference the following facts of this case 
L Issue, Facts: Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction, U.C.A, 78-45c-202, (UCA 202) 
Facts; IA&ffl .r LA/ Utah's non-uniformed UCGJEA statutes 
LA. False Pretense of Utah's non-uniformed UCCJEA statutes 
LA. Jurisdictional stability within the Utah's UCCJEA statutes 
The following excerpts summarize the facts, evidence and argument presented and to 
the Third District Court t>y the Petitioner/Appellee in the form of her Motion to Quash 
Service of Summons with supporting Memorandum (see addendum "d"): 
Motion to Quash Service of Summons: 
LA.1 page 2, introduction; starting with,- "According to the UCCJA, UC.A. § 78-45c ... 
LA.2 page 2, introduction, starting with; "Additionally, as allowed in XJCA. §78-45c... 
Continuing under the heading of "Facts": 
LA.3 page 2, item 1, starting with; "Prior to 1999, this Court granted a Decree of... 
LA.4 page 4 and 5, item I, starting with; "Utah does not have any significant connect... 
Continuing under the heading of "Argument": 
LA.5 page 7, item I cont, starting with; "This court must follow U.C.A. § 78-45c-202... 
Continuing under the heading of "Conclusion": 
7 
I.A.6 page 9, conclusion, starting with; "Based upon the UCCJA, codified in UC.A.... 
The Third District Courts Ruling and Order (see addendum *h"): 
Under the heading of "Background"; 
I.A.7, starting with: "Ahearing was scheduled and held August11, 2003... 
I.A.8, starting with: "On August 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present motion to quash... 
LA.9, starting with: "The court continued'the matter to allow respondent to respond,... 
I.A.10, starting with: "Oral argument was held November 17, 2003^... 
Under the heading of "Discussion"; 
LA.ll, starting with: "Under foe UCCJEA, UCA 78-45c-101 et seq., this court has... 
LA.12, starting with: "Thus, the court believes there are two reasons why it could... 
FactsrLB. 
I. Issue, Facts: Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction, U.C.A. 78-45c-202, (UCA 202) 
LB. Prioritizing evidence as a matter of UCCJEA law 
LB. Jurisdictional Standards as a matter of law in a UCCJEA proceeding 
The following excerpts summarize the facts and argument presented to theThlrd 
District Court by^tiiePetitioner/AppeBtee in the form of her Motion to Quash Service of 
Summons with supporting Memorandum (see addendum "d"): 
Motion to Quash Service of Summons: 
I.B.1 page L, item 1, starting with; "Jurisdiction and venue are properly vested within ... 
LB*2 page 2; item t cont, starting with; ^Specifically, Petitioner and the parties' min... 
I.B.3 page 2, item 1 cont, starting with; "Petitioner andKayla have lived in the State ... 
LB.4 page 2, item 1 cont., starting with; "No current evidence is available in the State ... 
8 
LB.5 page 2, item 1 cont., starting with; "Accordingly, pursuant to U.C.A §§78-45c-... 
LB.6 page 2, item 1 cont., starting with; "78-45c-201(l)(b)" (Initial Child-Custody... 
LB. 7 page 2, item 1 cont., starting with; "78-45c-207" (Inconvenient Porum)... 
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Quash Service of Summons: 
I.B.8 page 1, introduction, starting with; "The controlling law in this case is thelfn... 
LB.9 pages t and 2, introduction, starting with; "andcodified in U.C.A. §§78-45c-101 ... 
LB. 10 page 2, item 2, starting with; "Respondent was awarded liberal and reasonable... 
I.B.11 pages 2,3 and4, items 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, and 11; (these listed items relate only to 
i(best interest of the child" and not about jurisdictional standards). 
Continuing under the heading of "Argument": 
I.B.12 page 5, item I cont, starting with; "Petitioner andKayla moved from the State ... 
I.B.13page 5, item I cont; starting with.; "Utah, on the other hand, does not have any... 
LB. 14 page 6 and 7, Item 1 cont, starting with; "Liska v. Liska, is a case almost ident... 
I.B.15 page 8, item H, startnrgwith;"This CourtMustDecltneJurisdictionBasedl... 
I.B.16 page 8, kern II cont, starting with; "This court is unable to decide the issue... 
I.B.17 page 9, conclusion, starting with; "this Co urtmustfind that Petitioner and ... 
LB.18 page 9,conclusion, starting with; "Petitioner andKayla have continually reside... 
LB. 19 page 9, conclusion, starting with; "This Court should award costs and fees to... 
The Third District Courts Ruling and Order (see addendum *W): 
Underthe heading of "Background"; 
I.B.20 starting with: "The parties have been given joint physical custody "... 
I.B.21 starting with: "On June 30, 2003, respondent filed this petition to modify... 
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I.B.22 starting with: "On August 1, 2003, petitioner filed a motion in King County,... 
Under the heading of "Discussion"; 
I.B.23 starting with: "The child is there, and though the UCCJEA does not reflect... 
I.B.24 starting withr "These proceedings are STAYED in Utah and the matters to be... 
II. Issue, Facts: Simultaneous Proceedings, TJ.C.A. 78-45c-206, (UCA 2Q6) 
II.A. Unjustifiable Simultaneous Proceeding as a matter of UCCJEA law 
The following excerpts summarize the facts, evidence and argument presented to the 
Third District Court: by the Petitioner/Appellee in the form of her Motion to Quash 
Service of Summons with supporting Memorandum (see addendum "d"): 
Motion to Quash Service of Summons: 
II.A.1 page 2, item 1 cont, starting with; "this Court should decline jurisdiction and... 
II.A.2 page 2, item I cont, starting with; "to determine the appropriate jurisdiction... 
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Quash Service of Summons 
II.A.3 page 4, item 12, starting with; "Petitioner has filed an additional action in the... 
II.A.4 page 8 and 9, item TI cont, starting with; "This court must stay this action. .... 
II.A.5 page 9, item III, starting with; "This Court Should Communicate with the... 
II.A.6 page 9, conclusion, starting with; "Therefore, this Court must decline jurisdict... 
II.A.7 page 9, conclusion, starting with; "and/or communicate with the Washington... 
II.A.8 page 9, conclusion, starting with; "While this Court is determining this issue, it... 
The Third District Courts Ruling and Order (see addendum "h"): 
Under the heading of "Background"; 
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ILA.9, starting with: "On August 1, 2003, petitioner filed a motion in King County,... 
ILA.tO; starting with: "On August 11, 2003, petitioner filedthepresent motion to... 
II.A.11, starting writh: "Oral argument was held November 17, 2003^... 
Under the heading of "Discussion"; 
ELA.12, starting with: "The child is there, and though the UCCJEAdoes not reflect... 
II.A.13, starting with: "Theseproceedings are STAYED in Utah and the matters... 
HI. Issue, Facts: Inconvenient Forum, U.C.A. 78-45c-207, (UCA 207) 
IILA. Inconvenient Forum as a matter conformity to the UCCJEA law 
III. A. Inconvenient Forum Jurisdictional Standards asr a matter of law 
The following excerpts summarize the facts, evidence and argument presented to the 
Third District Court: by the Petitioner/Appellee in the form of her Motion to Quash 
Service of Summons with supporting Memorandum (see addendum "d"): 
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Quash Service of Summons 
Under thelieading of "Argument3\ 
III.A.1 number 6, II, pages 7 and $, starting with: "This Court Must Decline Jurisdict... 
III.A.2 number 6, H; page 8, starting with: "This court is unable to decide the issue... 
III.A.3 numher-6, H, page % starting with: "This court must stay this action. UCA. ... 
III.A.4 number 6, HI, page % starting with: "This Court Should Communicate with the... 
Under thetieadmg of "Conclusion": 
IH.A.5 page 9, starting with: "While this Court is determining this issue, it muststay... 
Third District Courts, Ruling and Order (see addendum "h"): 
Under the heading of Background; 
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IILA.6, starting ivith: "The parties have been given joint physical custody"... 
IILA.7, starting with: "The court ruled that it would take the matter under advisement... 
Under the heading of Discussion; 
IILA.8, starting with: "UCA78-45c-202.This state is inconvenient if another state... 
IH.A.9, starting with: "The second <xnd distinct reason U may dec is... 
IILA.10, starting with: "The mother, petitioner, and the child moved from Utah in ... 
IILA.11, starting with: "Respondent has remained in Utah Respondent has evidently... 
IILA.12, starting with: "The child was not in school before she left Utah in 1999, ie ... 
HLA.13, starting with: "Overall, the court believes that the proceeding in thisjurisdict... 
ffl.A.14, starting with: "These proceedings are STAYED in Utah and the matter is to... 
TV. Issue, Facts: Communication Between Courts, U.C.A. 78-45c-110, (UCA 110) 
IV.A. Communication Between Courts as a matter conformity to the UCCJEA law 
IV, A. Notice to persons outside state as a matter of UCC JEA law 
IV. A. Ex-parte Communication Between Courts as a matter of law 
IV. A. Notice Opportunity to be heard - Joinder as a^  matter of UCC JEA law 
On or about November 20,2003 attorneys for the Petitioner/Appellee, Ms T^ancy 
Missash in the state of Utah and Mr. Henry R. Hanssen, Jr., in the state of" Washington 
State both failed to give notice to Respondent/Appellant of Mr. Henry R. Hanssen, Jr. 
participation in the parties Utah UCC JEA proceeding, both failed in coping the 
Respondent/Appellant an exclusive letter mailed to the Honorable Helen L. Helpert, King 
County Superior Court, State of Washington, and faxed to the Honorable Judge Bruce C. 
Lubeck, Third District Court regarding "Young Parenting Plan Proceeding, King County 
Superior Court Case No. 03-3-09663-0 SEA, failed to notice to the Respondent/Appellant 
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of Mr. Henry R. Hanssen Jr. participation in the Chambers/Telephonic hearing between 
the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit County Utah and the 
Honorable Helen L. Helpert, King County Superior Court, State of Washington held on 
November 24, 2003. 
It is fact that the Honorable Judge Bruce C. Lubeck failed to hear, or receive oral or 
written argument from the Respondent/Appellant regarding the participation and 
submitting of written and oral of Mr. Henry R. Hanssen, Jr. during or after the November 
24,2003 hearing between the to state court and before a determination was made (see 
addendum "I")^ nd (see addendum "g"). 
The following excerpts summarize the facts, evidence and argument presented to the 
Third District Court l>y the Petitioner/Appellee in the form ofher Motion to Quash 
Service of Summons with supporting Memorandum (see addendum "d"): 
Under thelieading of "Argument": 
IV.AJ page 9, III, starting with: "This Court Should Communicate with the Washing ... 
Under the heading of "Conclusion": 
IV.A.2 page 9,starting with: "and/or communicate with the Washington Court to... 
Third District Court ruling and order (see addendum "h"):. 
Under thelieading of Discussion: 
IV.A.3, starting with: "The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the ... 
FV.A.4, starting with: "The court has now discussed the matter with the Honorable ... 
IV.A.5, The following excerpts summarize the transcription made from the 
chambers/telephonic ex parte communications and hearing held on November 24, 2003, 
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between Judge Bruce C. lAibeck, Judge Helen L.Helpert, and attorney Henry R. 
Hanssen, Jr. (addendum T , contains the complete context of this transcript.) 
On November 24,2003 a Chambers/Teleplionic hearing was held. Appearances 
where by the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit County Utah, 
appearing in Utah<^hambers. The Honorable Helen L. Helpert, King County ^ Superior 
Court, State of Washington, appearing Telephonically form Washington. And Mr. 
Hansen, Esquire of the Plaintiff (Petitioner/Appellee) in Wasliington, also appearing 
Telephonically form Washington. Issues 4. a-5, are in regards to the relevant fact of the 
said hearing, that was recorded and transcription made. 
Both the Utah and Washington trail courts failed to notice and serve the 
Respondent/Appellant of a hearing that was to include Mr. Hansen attorney for the 
Plaintiff (Petitioner/Appettee) where oral and written arguments where presented and 
herd. The following are annotates from the transcript made on November 24,2003, 
starting with (addendum "P): 
page 3, line 7 to 12; Judge Halpert: "Yes, and in court with me is Mr. Hansen, who 
represents the mother in Washington; is that correct? Mr. Hansen: That's correct 
Judge Lubeck: All right, let me I'll just make my record. I am in my office; no one is 
here. Page 4, tines 15 to 25, and page 5, lines 1 to 9; Judge Halpert: I would agree there 
is --1 don't - Mr. Hansen doesn't know if this is his problem or not. He wrote me a 
letter, which I got Friday, which explains Mon's position. I believe I asked that it also be 
faxed to you; I think my bailiff might have done that. Judge Lubeck: Yes. And I did 
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receive that (see addendum "g", for entire context of Mr. Hansen's written 
argument) Judge Halpert: But Mr. Hansen was relying on Utah counsel to serve Mr. 
Young and was had no idea whether thai happened. Judge Lubeck: Correct I don't 
have anything that indicates whether it did or didn 't. Mr. Hansen: (Inaudible). Judge 
Halpert: So, having said that, had Mr. Young had notice of this, he could have been in 
your court; correct? Judge Lubeck No. He didn't have notice from us of this. No, I 
didn't intend for either party to be here, to be part of this; at least I didn't set it up that 
way. If you think it should be, we can do that, but no, he did not have notice of this, and 
to my knowledge neither did Lara Young's attorney here in Utah. Page 9, lines 15 to 20; 
Judge Halpert: I don't think it's legally hard case. I mean, I don 7think Mr. Hansen is 
arguing that Washington be the home state for modification; he's arguing that it makes 
more sense to have it here, but not-1 don't think anyone disagrees as to what the law is, 
and that it is your choice. (End) (see addendum "P) and (see addendum "g"). 
V. Issue, Facts: Jurisdiction Declined By Reason Of Conduct, ILC.A, 78-45c-208, 
(UCAlt») 
V.A. Jurisdiction Declined By Reason Of Conduct as a matter oTTJCCJE A law 
V.A.1 The following facts relate to Respondent/Appellant's arguments presented to 
the Third District Court before it Ruling and Order was final. See addendums "e", for 
the full context on fact, evidence and arguments relating to die Utah Code Section 78-
45c-208 (UCA 208). Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. See addendum "e" 
Memorandum In Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To Quash; Service of 
Summons, pages 18 through 25: Utah Code Section 78-45c-208 (UCA 208), page 18, 
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(Vffl)(l)(2), starting witti^(VIII) This Court should... 
Page 25, (DQ(1)(3), starting with: "(IX) Information to be submittedrtocourt".... 
"Respondent/Appetlanf s Motions This Court To Reconsider its Ruling And Order 
Dated November 25, 2003" (see addendum "e"); page 3, item d, starting with: 
"Linking child... and Page 5, item 4(g). 
"Respondent/Appellant's Answer To Petitioners Motion To Quash Service of 
Summons" (see addendum "e"); page 1, item 2, starting with: "2. Petitioner ... 
Page 2, item 3, starting with: "3. Basis for Petitioners move of Jurisdiction and venue "... 
Page 2, item 6, starting with: "6. This Court should decline Petitioners, "Motion To... 
Page's 3, item 7, starting with: "7. Petitioner has committed fraud in not disclosing... 
Page 4, item 8, starting with: "8. The Petitioner is miss-guiding the Utah and Wash ... 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AND RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Had the Third District Court follow proper evidentiary standards due process 
UCCJEA procedures and prioritized the fact, evidence and arguments of thisr case it 
would have denied Petitioners Motion to Squash Service of Summons instead of its 
erroneous dismissal of Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction and Staying her motion. The 
following arguments relate to the jurisdictional standards as a matter of law in this case. 
These standards include UCCJEA due process procedures and the prioritizing of the 
facts, evidence and arguments are, and have, been available since 1997 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). The NCCUSL 1997 
enactment of the UCCJEA and its "prefatory note and comments" is the basis of these 
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following argument, and can be found in addendum *b": 
ARGUMENTS 
I. Issue Number One 
L Issue; Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction, U.C.A. 78-45c-202, (UCA 202) 
LA, - 1. Utah's non-uniformed UCCJEA statutes 
Because ofthefact that one of the two major, either UCA701 or UCA^Z02, statutes 
will determine the total outcome of a UCCJEA case, as a matter of law, the statutes must 
have continuity in its uniform contexts and numbering formatting, throughout the nation 
to have the same uniform presumption believe by all that are evolved with the case, such 
as this. Though buried within the "Prefatory Note and Comment" of theTSTCCUSL s^ 
final drafts are imperative and pivotal points of this case relating to the due process law. 
Starting within the "Prefatory Note", addendum "b", page 6 of 55, item 3. comments 
are as follow: 
"3. Exclusive cmitinuing jurisdiction for the State that entered the decree." "The 
second problem arises when it is necessary to determine whether the State with 
continuing jurisdiction has relinquished it There should be a clear basis to determine 
when that court has relinquished jurisdiction. " Emphasis added 
Under facts LA, facts LAI through LA. 6 are the excerpts of fact, evidence and 
argument by the Petitfoner/Appellee, submitted on August 11, 2003 to the Third District 
Court. These are one of many conflicting statute that the Petitioner/Appellee clearly 
argue and believe this^case "must" be ruled upon the context of Utah's UCA 78-45c-202. 
Items above under LA. facts, I.A.7 through LA. 12 is the excerpts of context as stated by 
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the Third Districts Courts ruling and order on November 25, 2003 regarding this case. 
Facts I.A.7 through I.A. 11 mostly give clarity on when hearings took place, and that it 
wanted to confirm itliad jurisdiction under Utalfs UCA78-45c-202 (UCA 202), 
Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction (UCA 202). Facts LA. 12, state by the Third District 
Court, that it "believes there are two reasons" to decline jurisdiction under Utah^s 202. 
It i s fact, Utah law has three paragraphs of context in Utah UCA 202 ta decline 
jurisdiction, with two difference presumptions beliefs to choose and base a decline of 
jurisdiction from. 
The confusion^reated by the Utah legislators started with the first two of three sets of 
UCA202 context; UtahVUCA 202 (1) "until one of two events occur" (a) significant 
connection /jsubstantial evidence, (b) no longer resides in Utah, along with its link to 
UCA 78-45c-207 (UCA 207) in which the left behind contestant has failed somewhere 
along the criteria of 202 (l)(b) and UCA 207. The path to UCA 207 through UCA 202 
(l)(b) creates the first presumption that the contestant "no longer resides" in Utah and is 
an Inconvenient T'orum (UCA 207), this path is defined in the NCCUSL prefatory note 
and comments, page 27 of 55 (see addendum "b"), you arrive at the following: 
"In accordance with the majority ofUCCJA case law, the State with exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction may relinquish jurisdiction when it determines that another State 
would be a more convenient forum under the principles of Section 207") 
Emphasis added. 
Utah's UCA202 <1) "(a) and (b)" are the "first" and "second" context, and with UCA 
202 (2) being^the "third". The first presumption to decline jurisdiction based on the UCA 
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207's is UCA 202(1 )(b) contestant "no longer resides", then the Utah legislators went a 
step further and created UCA 202 (2) which brought forth a stand alone second 
presumption of "relative circumstances" of a contestant. 
In addition of the Utah legislators creation of UCA 202 (2) was its failure to exclude the 
NCCUSL's related UCA 202 (l)(b) comments on page 27 of 55 of the prefatory note, 
therefore any sighting of the UCA 78-45c-202 in a UCCJEA case, such as this one, 
I.A.11 and I A. 12, makes for un-clear basis of presumption in which to formulate 
evidence and as a matter evidentiary standard of law, or a way to have constitutional due 
process. As with this case, the Third District Court ruling and order (LA. 12) 
fail to distinguish which presumption it chose in UCA 202, in which they sought a 
distinct reason to decline jurisdiction through UCA 207's Inconvenient Forum.. 
The Third District Court failed specify, or as the NCCUSL states "There should be a 
clear basis to determine when that court has relinquished jurisdiction", as to which of the 
3 sets of context within Utah's 202 they have chosen and clearly defined the presumptive 
path to Utah's UCA 78-45c-207 Inconvenient forum. Furthermore, no evidentiary 
standard has been, or could ever have been, met. Thus, the ruling and order in 
question is a violation of the Respondents/Appellants due process of uniform UCCJEA 
law, and an act of bad faith by the Third District Court for stating un-uniform statutory 
factors. 
LA. - 2. False Pretense of Utah's non-uniformed UCCJEA statutes 
According to the NCCULS, 37 of 38 states to date, legislated the UCCJEA 202 
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uniform text verbatim, along with its formatted numbers (see addendum V ) . 37 states 
in this country that have enacted the new UCCJEA can only assume they have the same 
uniform text, numbering and presumptive belief on a co-define 101 basis as the other 38 
uniform UCCJEA states. Utah so far, is the only state that has legislators that have 
changed the numbers and added text to its UCA 202 statute, UCA §§ 78-45c-202 (1) 
"continues until one of two events occurs" (a) or (b), (2) ((2) being the new and third 
context and second presumption). 
When a Utah court relinquishes its jurisdiction (I.A.1, "this court must decline" and 
I.A.2)), it is on the uniformed presumption by all other states that the ruling and order 
(Third District Courts LA. 12) was based on the same uniformed UCCJEA's text and 
numbers format such as Washington state in this case, who UCA 202 statute is verbatim 
to NCCUSL's texts (see addendum "b"). The state of Washington can only presume 
that a case, such as this, was sold to them on the uniform UCA 202 (l)(b) principles of a 
207 basis, in which according to their statute can only occur if "one" the "two event" 
occur, "Continuing jurisdiction is lost when the child, the child's parents, and any person 
acting as a parent "on longer reside " in the original decree state." 
Whereby, it was a flagrant act of bad faith when Utah's Third District Court failed to 
distinguish, define and disclose in its communications with the State of Washington 
(issue IV) of which of Utah's two UCA 202 presumption it choose to determine the 
ruling and order of this case. Therefore, it was an act of committing fraud when the 
Third District Court sold the jurisdiction of the parties to the State of Washington, under 
the false pretense of Utah's non-uniform UCA 202, item number (l)(b),. 
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Furthermore as ^ matter of UCCJEA uniform law, a flaw of this magnitude, nullifies 
Utah's own version of UCA 202 (Utah's UCA 78-45c-202) and the entire chapter 
under Utah's UCA 101. This flaw not only effects this case as a matter of due process 
law, but the entire set of UCA 101 statutes, including the governing UCCJEA's federal 
PAKA and its law enforcement, such as the new enacted Amber Alert System. A sample 
of how this flaw effect law enforcement is stated within the NCCUSL "Prefatory Note", 
page 7 of 55, under the heading of "Enforcement Provisions", comments on "Lack of 
uniformity" is as follow, (see addendum "b"): 
"Lack of uniformity complicates the enforcement process in several ways: (I) It increases 
the cost of the enforcement action in part because the services of more that one lawyer 
may be required- one in the original forum and one in the State where enforcement is 
sought; (2) It decreases the certainty of outcome; (3) It can turn enforcement into along 
and drawn out procedure. A parent opposed to the provisions of a visitation 
determination may be able to delay implementation for many months, possible even 
years, thereby frustrating not only the other parent, but also the process that led to the 
issuance of the original court order." Emphasis added: 
Additionally, i t is also un-constitutional and of bad faith for the NCCULS (to 
recommend) and Utah to legislate a statute (UCA §§ 78-45c-101) asking for stability in 
jurisdiction's amatter of law to prosecute cases relating to UCCJEA governing PAKA 
laws, then allowing under the same set of statutes a contradiction of un-stability of 
jurisdiction (using UCA 207, either by it self, and/or via Utah's 202 (b) or 202 (2)) 
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whereby discriminating and disenfranchising it members of all Utah's divorce, separated 
and never married restructured families, (the NCCUSL's UCCJEA 207, and Utah's UCA 
§§ 78-45c-207{4) allows a stand alone reason to decline jurisdiction, it states; "The issue 
of inconvenient forum maybe raised upon the court's own motion, request of another 
court, or motion of a party", and basis its finding on un-defined guidance of, "relative 
circumstances ") 
Utah's current and future disenfranchises restructured families are the poor or middle 
class citizens that can not defend them self as a matter of law from a state that 
discriminates against its people (Respondent/Appellant in this case) in a UCCJEA 
proceedings. With this case, and others to follow, UCCJEA's UCA 207 encourages the 
bad faith and in-stability of forum shopping by the moving parent as with the 
Petitioner/Appellee in this case. These cases will be the precedents that set UGCJEA 
standards as & matter of law, a law that is already extremely vague and guideless, and will 
greatly effect the stability and relationship between the left behind (parent) restructured 
family and their children. 
Whether or not title ^ 'relative circumstances", UCA 207, of the left behind Utah parent is 
poor, disabled, ill-mannered, uncivil, and difficult to deal with or work with, is where 
UCA 207's contradiction to a Utah culture that prides itself with taking anyone in this 
world under it wing, and then nurture it. A Utah culture thatrspends 24 hours, 7 days a 
week on unity and involvement on the intact family relationship, then only to legislate as 
a statute as a matter of law that sells out from underneath them its citizens jurisdictional 
stability to another state on the whim of un-constitutional discrimination, as with this case 
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inliand(FactsLA.12). 
LB, - 1. Prioritizing evidence as a matter of UCCJEA law 
Prioritizing Evidence as a matter of UCCJEA law, the Petitioner/Appellee is asking 
the Utah District Court to "decline jurisdiction^ bases on the yse of the old UCCJA 
statute and case precedence (I.B.8 and I.B.14), and/or combining the context of the five 
(5) UCCJEA statutes. The Petitioner/Appellee failed to prioritize whether or not this is a 
UCA 201 or UCA 202 case, and further failed to prioritizes the follow fact, evidence and 
argument as amatter of UCCJEA law; UCCJA vs. UCCJEA, §§78-45c201 Initial Child-
Custody Determination (I.B.I, I.B.6, andI.B.9), §§ 78-45c-202, Exclusive, Continuing 
Jurisdiction (I.B. 17), §§78-45c-207 Inconvenient Forum (I.B.7, I B . 15, andI.B.16), and 
to be compensated in the form of "cost and fees", "for having to defend\ a "matter" they 
have "Motion Toi)uasti"the court for under Utah's article IE, §§ 78-45c-312 (UCA 312) 
Cost, Fees, andExpenses (LB: 19). UCA 312 is listed under Article 3 "Enforcement, and 
does not apply 4oHieir motion, also see Respondent/Appellant argument on pages 10 and 
11,items (V)(l)(2) UCA 206, Jurisdiction toy modify'determination,adderrdumi4en. 
With regarded prioritization of due process in a UCCJEA proceeding can be found within 
theNCCUSL's "Prefatory Note", stated on page 32 of 55 of if s final draft, under the 
heading of "SECTION 206. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS"; the first comment 
states (see addendum *fc"): 
"Most of the problems have been resolved be the prioritization of home state jurisdiction 
under SectionlOl; the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction provisions of Section 202; and 
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the prohibitions on modification of Section 203. If there is a home State, there can be no 
exercise of significant connection jurisdiction in and initial child custody determination 
and, therefore, no simultaneous proceedings. If there is a State of exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction, there cannot be another State with concurrent jurisdiction and, therefore, 
no simultaneozis proceedings. Emphasis added. 
Also see addendum "j"; Under the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), "Juvenile Justice Bulletin" article 
entitled, "The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and EnforcementAct' ', by Patricia M. 
Hojf, dated December 2001 (www, ncjrs. org/pdffilesl/oiidp/189181.pdf); 
page 5 states this fact; starting with: "Initial and Modification Determinations", "The 
UCCJEA governs courts' jurisdiction to issue permanent, temporary, initial, and 
modification orders. The rules thatgoverncourts'jurisdiction to make and initial 
custody determination differ from those governing jurisdiction to modify an existing 
order. The type ofcustodyproceedingdetermines which rules apply and whether a court 
has the authorityio act." Emphasis added. 
The facts, evidence and argument presented b r the Petitioner/Appellee where not 
prioritized to ^ n evidentiary standard as a matter of law for this UCCJEA case, issue IB . 
Therefore as a matter of law, the Petitioner/Appellee violated the Respondent/Appellants 
rights to due process, facts I.B.20 through I.B.24, in regards to trying apply and argue 
the Petitioner/Appellee's Motion to Quash that has cited and bases its motion on the 
miss-construe iise of the old UCCJA statute and case precedence, in addition to 
combining the conflicting context of the five (5) Utah UCCJEA UCA 101 statutes that 
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contain multiple presumptive beliefs. 
As a matter of law, the Third District Court erroneously failed when marshaling and 
prioritizing, iacts I.B.I through T.B.I 9, of the facts, evidence and argument presented as 
an evidentiary standard by the Petitoner/Appellee that could have never been met by 
anyone, includingihe Respondent/Appellant in this case. Tor the Third District Court to 
circumvent and/or de-scramble the overwhelming miss-construe evidence and argument 
for the Petitioner/Appellee benefit, was an act of bad faith and collusion far be-on his 
discretionary judicial latitude. Whereby effecting due process UCCJEA laws and creating 
a negative outcome for theRespondent/Appellant in his ruling and order of this case. 
LB. - 2. Jurisdictional Standards as a matter of law in a UCCJEA proceeding 
All of the Petitioner/Appellee evidence, facts and argument listed throughout her 
Motion To Quash Service of Summons, including pages 2,3 and 4, items 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 
and 11 and above facts I.B.I through I.B.I 9, is basing her finding on citing both the old 
UCCJA statues and case law, and the new UCCJEA statutes, while re-interjecting 
"substantive standards relating to custody and visitation of child" statement through her 
Motion To Quash Service of Summons (this case) (addendum "d"). Insisting that the 
old UCCJA "best interest" standard should ("must") override the jurisdictional standards 
for a determinations of this UCCJEA cases. 
The NCCUSL^s prefatory notes (see addendum "b") make a clear point of why the term 
and presumption "best interests" and/or "substantive standards" of the child has been 
eliminated in the newer UCCJEA as a matter of law, and clearly replaces it with 
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"jurisdictional standards", as stated on Page 7 of 55, number 5; with the comment of: 
"5. Role of "Best Interests." The jurisdictional scheme of the UCCJA was designed to 
promote the best interests of the children whose custody was atlssue by discouraging 
parental abduction and providing that, in general the State with the closest connections 
to, and the most evidence regarding, a child should decide that child^s custody. The 
<(best interest" language in the jurisdictional sections of the JCCJA was not intended to 
be an invitation to address the merits of the custody dispute in the jurisdictional 
determination or to otherwise provide that "bestinteresf considerations should override 
jurisdictional determinations or provide an additional jurisdictional basis. 
The UCCJEA eliminates the term "best interests" in order to clearly distinguish between 
the "jurisdictional standards" and the substantive standards relating to custody and 
visitation of children. " Emphasis added. 
It is of bad faith for the Petitioner/Appellee to filelier entire Motion To Quash Service of 
Summons on the elementary basis of a "best interests" substantive standards relating to 
custody and visitation of the minor child that does not belong and/or should exist within 
the fact, evidence and argument of a Utah UCCJEA proceeding, such as this case in hand. 
As a matter of AJCCJEA law, the Third District Court erroneously failed when marshaling 
and prioritizing the lack of, "jurisdictional standard" within the Petitioner/Appellee's 
entire Motion To Quash Service of Summons, pages 2,3, and 4, items 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
and 11, and above facts I.B.I through IB. 19 including the above facts I.B.I through 
I.B.m 
Furthermore, The Third District Court erroneously failed by not taking into account, but 
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instead choose «t>ad faith to ignore the numerous jurisdictional standards fact, evidence 
and argument brought forth throughout Respondents/Appellants motion to "Reconsider", 
"Answer", and "Memorandum", of Petitioners/Appellee^ s "Motion To Quash ^ Service of 
Summons, (see addendum "i") "Respondent/Appellant9s Motions This Court To 
Reconsider its Ruling And Order Dated November 25,2003"; Page TO and 11, item 
(V)(l)(2): 
"Respondent/Appellanf s Memorandum In Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To 
Quash; Service Of Summons"; page 4 and 5, item (I), page 6, item (HI), page 6 and 7, 
item (III)(2),page 9 and 10, Item (IV)(1)(2)(3)(4), page 3, item d: page 4, Item 4(a), page 
5, item 4(g) (see addendum "e"): 
"Respondent/Appellanf s Answer To Petitioners Motion To Quash Service of 
Summons"; page 1, item 2, page 2, item 4, page 2, item 6 (see addendum "e"); 
"Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum In Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To 
Quash; Service Of Summons", Page 4 and 5, items (I, 1 through 6), page 6, item (HI), 
page 6 and 7, item tTH)(2), page 7, Item (I1I)(3), page 8, item (ffi)(5), page 9 and 10, item 
(IV)(l)(2)(3)(4),page 9,10 and 11, item (IV)(1)(2)(3)(4), page 10and 11, item (V)(l)(2), 
page 16, (VinX5)(6), page 17, (Vm)(9), page 33, (Conclusion) (addendum "e"). 
Within the Third District^ourt^ ruling and Order; Under the heading of "Discussion" 
states a key point of Judge Lubeck's argument, listed as fact; LB.23: 
"The cftftdris there, andthouzh the UCCJEA does not reflect that the best interest of the 
child is a weighty consideration, it is to this court": Emphasis added. 
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The phrase "jandthouzft' within Judge Lubeck's Third District Court ruling and order is 
proof that Judge Lubeck knew of the statutory factors required with any UCCJEA 
proceedings. 
Whether or notthe UCCJEA "reflect ihe"best interest of the child" is for Judge Lubeck 
is for Judge Lubeck to have found the only UCCJEA statement regarding "best interest of 
the child" on page 7 of 55, number 5 of the NCCUSL's 1997 UCCJEA final draft and 
prefatory notes (see addendum "b"), thus having full statutory knowledge that the newer 
UCCJEA ha4 eliminated the term "best interests" as a matter oflaw. 
It can not be expected of anyone, including the Respondent/Appellant in a UCCJEA case 
such as this, to submit evidence and l>e effective with argument when Judge Lubeck of 
the Third District Court deliberately employs his judicial powers to subvert the UCCJEA 
(101) statutes^nd circumvents the intent of an evidentiary standard of UCCJEA law, a 
law of which is governed by the federal mandated PKPA. Therefore, basing an entire 
ruling and order of this case on "best Interest" is a "weighty consideration" and not a 
clearly distinguishable jurisdictional UCCJEA standards as a matter oflaw, is an act of 
bad faith and^ violation of the Respondent/Appellanf s constitutional rights of due 
process in thi& case. 
II Issue Number Two 
II. Issue: Simultaneous Proceedings, U.C.A. 78-45c-206, (UCA 206) 
ILA, - 1. Unjustifiable Simultaneous Proceeding as a matter of UCCJEA law 
Because the Petitioner/Appellee felt the need to forum shop, there are currently 
Simultaneous Proceeding in Utah and Washington States as stated with the following: 
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"and discuss in which forum is most appropriate for this case to proceed ( fact ELA.5)", 
"to determining the most appropriate forum for these proceedings ( fact II. A. -7)". 
Wherefore, with Petitioner/Appellee's filing a, "Petitioner has filed an additional action 
in the State of Washington (fact II.A.3)", and/or, "case already commenced in the state 
of Washington (feet DLA.6)" (see addendum "c"), was further asking the Third District 
Court to "and confer with the Honorable Helen L. Halper Kins County Superior Court 
Judze"(fact H.A. IV" This Court Should Communicate with the Washington Court (fact 
II.A.5), "and/or communicate with the Washington Court (fact II.A.7)". Further stating: 
"Petitioner has filed an additional action in the State of Washington, Kins County 
Superior Court case number 03-3-09663-0 SEA before the Honorable Helen L. HalperU 
seeking enforcement of% f^ 2,3,4,5,6,12,13, and 14 of the Decree of Divorce (fact 
ILA.3)". It should be noted that there have never been any additional actions filed 
regarding enforcement Washington State, where by her statement to the Third District 
Court is fraudulent 
See the following addendum ae", "Respondent/Appellanf s Memorandum In 
Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To Quash; Service Of Summons" regarding 
simultaneous proceedings: "There are currently, "Simultaneous proceeding" on pages; 
11, 12 and 13, (VI)(1)(4)(5): 4. This Utah court should encourage the termination of the 
Washington State proceeding, "Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct Page 18, 
(VIII)(l):MPetitionerfailedto disclose" Page 26, (IX)(6):6. Petitioner failed to 
disclose the facts to the state of Washington and Utah, that there are currently, 
"Simultaneou^proceedings", in both Washington and Utah courts. 
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Judicial interpretation of a Simultaneous Proceedings in a UCCJEA case is apparent 
and clear, and basically states; as a matter of law there can not be two jurisdiction having 
simultaneous proceedings taking place at the same time with the same case. 
Petitioner/Appellee never filed a motion in Utah to relinquish and/or '"been terminated" 
jurisdiction before filing her pending motion to modify in the State of Washington, 
whereby creating "concurrent jurisdiction". Basic principle of protocol, with regarded to 
Simultaneous UCA 206, due process in a UCCJEA proceeding canl)e found within the 
NCCUSL's "Prefatory Note", page 6 of 55, item 3. comments are as follow (see 
addendum *fi"): 
"3. Exclusive continuing jurisdiction for the State (hat entered the decree. 
"The ambiguity regarding whether a court has declined jurisdiction can result in one 
court improperly exercising jurisdiction because it erroneouslylyelieves that the other 
court has declined jurisdiction. This caused simultaneous proceedings and conflicting 
custody orders " Emphasis added. 
And further states on page 32 of 55 of the NCCUSUs final draft, under thelieading of 
"SECTION 206. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS"; the first comment states (see 
addendum *tf>): 
"The problem <rf simultaneous proceedings is no longer a significant issue. Most of the 
problems have been resolved be the prioritization of home state jurisdiction under 
Section 20 L the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction provisions of Section 202; and the 
prohibitions on modification of Section 203. If there is a home State, there can be no 
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exercise of significant connection jurisdiction in and initial child custody determination 
and, therefore, no simultaneous proceedings. If there is a State of exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction, there cannot he another State with "concurrent jurisdiction" and, therefore, 
no simultaneous proceedings. Emphasis added. 
As a matter of law it can not be expected of any one, including the Respondent/Appellant 
in this case to presentrfkcts, evidence and argue and defend a case accurately^ that has an 
opponent who deliberately commits fraud, demands un-necessary communication of 
judges, and file Simultaneous Proceedings in orderto forum shop. The unjustifiable 
conduct of fihng Simultaneous Proceedings by the Petitioner/Appellee is a costly act of 
bad faith and disrespects of Respondents/Appellants right to due process law. Cost 
associated with not only a thousand plus hours and expenses accumulated l)y the 
Respondent/Appellant to defend this matter in two jurisdiction including this appeal, but 
also the wasted expense of time and moneys by the Washington and Utah courts (see 
Washington State invoices, addendum "L"). 
Whereby, a matter of UCCJEA law, at the Oral hearing on November 17,2003, the Third 
District Court should have concurred with the Respondent/Appellants fact, evidence and 
arguments presented in his '"Memorandum In Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To 
Quash Service of Summons (see addendum "e"), and denied Petitioner/Appellee Motion 
To Quash Service of Summons and then re-directed her to the proper UCCJEA due 
process procedures, in which did not happen. 
This is therefore, as a matter of law, the Third District Court erroneously failed when 
marshaling and prioritizing the statutory factors of a UCCJEA proceeding, including 
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Issue II, facts H.A.1 through II. A/8, of the facts and evidence presented in bad faith by 
the Petitioner/Appellee and deliberately ignoring that simultaneous proceeding were 
occurring atihe time of Ms ruling and order. By the Third District Court not sticking to 
the '''conformity with this chapter" it has violated the Respondent/Appellanf s rights to 
due process of this case. 
III. Issue Number Three 
III. Issue: Inconvenient Forum, Utah Codes Ann. 78-45c-2G7 (UCA 207) 
IH.A. - 1. Inconvenient Forum as a matter conformity to the UCCJEA law 
At the time of the oral hearing on November 17, 2003, as a matter of the technical 
merits of fundamental due process laws of this case, listed in this brief as issues number; 
LA, LB.1,LB.2, and issues II, should have declined Petitioner/Appellee Motion To Quash 
Service of Summons as a matter of law. 
Judicial discretion should not have allowed the movement of this case forward passed the 
November 17, 2003 oral hearing. Wherefore, continuing this case without conformity to 
this chapter by adding "Communication between the Courts" (issues number IV.), HLA.7 
"take the matter under advisement and contact the court in Washington ", IV.A.3 "The 
court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the entire file, and heard oral 
argument, concludes as follows.", and further "STAYED" (IILA.14) this ruling and order "finding 
this is an inconvenient forum under UCA 78-45c-2QT (IILA.14), therefore moving forward and 
basing any part of the Third District Court ruling and order on these above issues number III 
UCA 207 pf this brief, is a act of bad faith that violates the Respondent/Appellant due process as 
a matter of UCCJEA law. 
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III.A. - 2. Inconvenient Forum Jurisdictional Standards as a matter of law 
Throughout this case, Petitioner/Appellee has lacked any evidentiary 'jurisdictional 
standards" when basing her facts, evidence, and argument when she chose to motion the 
Third District Court with her 'To Quash Service of Summons". Under this Issue number 
III UCA 207, Inconvenient Forum, IH.A.1 expresses the key to Petitioner/Appellee 
argument, "Based Upon Utah Being: an Inconvenient Forum for Petitioner andKavla '\ 
and continues to states in HI. A.2, "due to all substantial evidence concerning Kavla is 
found in Washington ". These statements by the Petitioner/Appellee "for Petitioner and 
Kavla" and "concerning Kavla" clearly indicate a C€best interest" of the child standard, 
whereby asserting a standard that has been eliminated in any UCCJEA terminology 
and/or proceedings. 
The NCCUSL's prefatory notes make it clear that the term and presumption "best 
interests" and/or ^substantive standards" of the child has been eliminated in the newer 
UCCJEA, and clearly replaces it with 'jurisdictional standards", as stated on Page 7 of 
55, number 5, see addendum "b" and/or Issue I.B.-2 of this brief. 
To date there are 171 instruments of record on file at Utah's Third District Court 
relating to the parties jurisdictional issues, see addendum "k". For the 
Petitioner/Appellee to state (T0LA.2) "documents would have to be produced from 
Washington", "Would have to be produced^ is a fraudulent statement. 
Petitioner/Appellee further miss-represented the facts by introducing (IILA.1) "school 
records, teacher opinions, doctors records, childcare information, personal 
relationships" as miss-construed issues that relate more to "best interest" and/or to the 
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priority of new records in aUCCJEA201 Initial Child-Custody case, which this case is 
not (see miss-construed 201 issues on page23, Issues I.B., argument I. Prioritizing 
Evidence). 
It is also evident in Judge Lubeck of the Third District Court ruling and order, that lie is 
not familiar with, or read the parties case file in order to make clear and concise judicial 
decision on evidentiary standards. As a matter of law, he fails in his statements to clearly 
base, or state, what jurisdictional evidence of "relative circumstances of the parties" 
related to hisjstatutory '"weighting" of facts within UCA78-45c-207. The following is a 
sample of his findings: listed with ffl.A.6, "The partiesr have been given joint physical 
custody", where they have not; and with III. A. 12 "It is not in the record exactly what 
schools she has been attending, when she started, nor where all the records are ", and 
IH.A.13 "Any records concerning the child in Utah would be at least 4 years old". 
Though his later statement pertains to un-related issues of best interest of the child. His 
statement o£ "where all the records are", and/or "any records", of what schools Kayla has 
"been attending", show his lack of care and/or research of information available to him 
within the 171 instruments (addendum "k") of the parties records, located at the Third 
District Court House where he works. 
As a matter of law, the Third District Court could not have properly "marshaled" any of 
the facts, evidence or argument presented by the Petitioner/Appellee in this case, 
including issues Hi, items III.A.1 through III. A. 5 when her argument lacks any 
"jurisdictional standards" relating to "relative circumstances of the parties" needed to 
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(in.A. 14) "Stayed" this or any Utah UCCJEA proceeding. The Third District Court 
ruled; HLA.13, 'The child is there, and though the UCCJEA does not reflect that the best 
interest ofthe^hHd is a weighty consideration, it is to this court". The UCCJEA highly 
reflects a "jurisdictional standards" in this country as a means to uniformity that is 
necessary to meet the evidentiary standard in a UCCJEA proceeding, such as this one. 
The Third District Court exceeded its discretionary latitude when it employed hrs judicial 
powers to subvert the UCCJEA UCA 207 statutes and circumvents "best interest of the 
child" as the evidentiary standard into its ruling and order. Furthermore, the Third 
District Court stated; "Theseproceedings are STAYED in Utah and the matter is to be 
considered in Washington under petitioner's petition to modify, court finding this is an 
inconvenient forum under UCA 78-45c-207. ". As a matter of UCCJEA law, for the 
Third District Court to fine this is an inconvenient forum under the duress of 
Simultaneous Proceeding, without jurisdictional evidence from the Petitioner/Appellee 
and/or to subvert and circumvents all UCA 207 statutory factors and further "STAYED" 
(EH. A. 14) this ruling, was an act of bad faith and discretionary abuse that violates the 
Respondent/Appellant due process as a matter of UCCJEA law in this case. 
Respondent/Appeilanf s submitted the following UCA 207 evidence and argument, see 
addendum "e", "Respondent/Appeilanf s Memorandum In Support To Decline 
Petitioners Motion To Quash; Service Of Summons", page 13 and 14, (Vni)(l)(2), page 
16, (VHI)(5)(6), page 17, (Vffl)(9): 
Also see this^ppeals cases docking statement, Issue (a): Inconvenient Forum, Subsection 
(c) (d): (h) (h, b, and g) and Conclusion. 
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IV Issue Number Four 
IV. Issue: Communication Between Courts, U .CA 78-45c-110, (UCA 110) 
IV.A - 1. Communication Between Courts as a matter conformity to the UCCJEA 
law 
At the time of the oral hearing, regarding this case on November 17, 2003, as a matter 
of law the technical merits of fundamental due process of this case, listed in this brief as 
issues number; I.A., I.A.1J.B.2, and issues II, should have declined Petitioner/Appellee 
Motion To Quash Service of Summons by the Third District Court. 
Judicial discretion should not have allowed the forward movement of this case, passed 
the November 17, 2003 oral hearing. Wherefore, continuing this case without conformity 
to this chapter by adding "Communication between the Courts" (UCA 110)(this issues 
number IV.), IQ.A.7 "take the matter under advisement and contact the court in 
Washington", IV. A.3 "The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, and heard oral argument, concludes as follows", and further "STAYED" 
(III. A. 14) this ruling and order "finding this is an inconvenient forum under UCA 78-
45C-20T' (IQ. A. 14), therefore, as a matter of UCCJEA law, moving forward and basing 
any parts of the Third District Court ruling and order on above issues number IV. of this 
brief, is an act of bad faith that violates Respondent/Appellant's due process of law. 
Furthermore; Respondent/Appellant's brought forth the following argument in his 
Memorandum In Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To Quash; Service of 
Summons: Page 32, (XII): (XII) (also see addendum "e") "This Court should 
Communicate with the Washington State court and concur in a decline of Petitioner's, 
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"Motion To Quash Service of Summons". Before a ruling and order determination was to 
be made, courtesy of the Third District Court should have "communicated'' with the 
Washington State court and concur that, by matter of UCCJEA law, bad faith 
simultaneous proceeding where occurring in both courts. And that the basis of the 
Petitioners/Appellee's fact, evidence and filing of arguments in both Utah and 
Washington state courts, which relate to non-jurisdictional evidentiary standards (also a 
matter of UCCJEA law), and is more of an action of bad faith to forum shop in the state 
of Washington. 
IV,A - 2. Notice to persons outside state as a matter of UCCJEA law 
Petitioner/Appellee failed to give "notice to" and "service" of the hearing that she 
and/or her attorney attended and took place on November 24,2003, above fact IV.A.5 
(see addendum "f', transcript), along with the failure to serve and give notice of 
written arguments (see addendum "g", letter), letter dated November 20, 2003, sent 
to "The Honorable Helen L. Halpert", and then was forward and submitted via 'faxed' to 
the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck at the Third District Court. These failures to give notice 
and service to the Respondent/Appellant is a matter of UCCJEA law, mandated under 
Utah Codes Ann. 78-45c-108 (1)(2) (UCA 108), 
Washington RCW 26.27.081 (l)(2)(which are verbatim with both states statutes). And 
further stated on page 17 of 55 of the NCCUSL final draft under prefatory note, states 
this leading comment regarding section 108 (UCA 108)(see addendum "b"): 
Whereby as a matter of UCCJEA law, failure to give "Notice required for the exercise of 
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jurisdiction when a person is outside this state''1 and "Proof of service" under UCA 108, 
by the Petitioner/Appellee for which created an ex-parte hearing and written argument 
that could not be fairly and fiilly argued against by the Respondent/Appellant, was an act 
of bad faith that negatively effected the outcome for the Respondent/Appellant of the 
Third District Courts decision, whereby violating the Respondents/Appellant rights to 
due process. 
IV. A - 3. Ex-parte Communication Between Courts as a matter of law 
Petitioner/Appellee demanded in her "Memorandum in Support of Motion To Quash 
Service of Summons", facts number IV. A. 1 and IV.A.2, that "court-to-court 
communication" take place between the Honorable Helen L. Halpert of the State of 
Washington and the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck of the Utah Third District Court. The 
communication between courts hearing took place on November 24, 2003, fact IV.A.5 
(see addendum "f", transcript). Petitioner/Appellee in bad faith, failed to give notice 
and/or server notice (above argument 2) of her attorney intended participation of said 
hearing to Respondent/Appellant, and where at said hearing oral and written (see 
addendum "g", letter) arguments were presented in person by attorney for 
Petitioner/Appellee Mr. Henry C. Hansen, thus creating a before, during and after one 
sided ex-parte hearing and argument. 
As a matter of law, the Utali Code Ann. 78-45c-110 (2) (UCA 110), Washington RCW 
26.27.101 (2)(which are verbatim with both states statutes) Communication Between 
Courts, states the following: (2) "If the parties are not able to participate in the 
communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity to present facts and legal 
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arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made. " 
And specifically stated on Page 19, and 20 of 55 of the NCCUSL final draft, under 
prefatory note,4hese comment regarding section UCA 110 (addendum "b"): 
<(Communication between courts is required under Sections 204, 206, and 306 and 
strongly suggested in applying Section 207. Apart form those sections, there may be less 
need under this Act for courts to communicate concerning jurisdiction due to the 
prioritization of home state jurisdiction. Emphasis added. 
And continues: 
"The second sentence of subsection (b) protects the parties against unauthorized ex parte 
communications. The parties' participation in the communication may amount to a 
hearing if there is an opportunity to present facts and jurisdictional arguments. 
However, absent such an opportunity, the participation of the parties should not to be 
considered a substitute for a hearing; and the parties must be given an opportunity to 
fairly and fully present facts and arguments on the "jurisdictional issue " before a 
determination is made. This may be done through a hearing or, if appropriate, by 
affidavit or memorandum. The court is expected to set forth the basis for its 
jurisdictional decision, including any court-to-court communication which may have 
been a factor in the decision. " Emphasis added. 
Both the Utah and Washington trial court judges had enough dialogue between them 
selves at the pre-hearing conference call on November 17, 2003, regarding scheduling of 
the hearing on November 24,2003 to invite all parties, whereby either serve and notify 
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and/or require to serve and notify all included parties as a matter of law before the 
hearing. Or, stop the hearing as a matter of law and proceed with correct due process of 
civil and UCCJEA procedures, thereby avoiding any ex-parte hearings. 
Therefore, as a matter of law under this chapter, including UCCJEA UCA 110., the Third 
District Court statements contained above in IV.A.3, and IV.A.4, summary of its ruling 
and order is un-true. As an act of bad faith, the Third District Court failed to allow the 
Respondent/Appellant " the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a 
decision on jurisdiction is made. ". Furthermore; without representation of the 
Respondent/Appellant at the November 24, 2003 hearing, the solo bad faith appearance 
by Mr. Hansen had influence any court-to-court communication which may have been a 
factor in the decision. ", of judgment in advance and after, causing a negative outcome for 
the Respondent/Appellant by way of the Utah District Court making a determination to 
stay the motion, and move jurisdiction from Utah to Washington state, and where as a 
matter of law, the Respondent/Appellant was wronged by both states trial courts lack of 
due process, and the bad faith actions of Mr. Hansen. 
IV.A - 4. Notice Opportunity to be heard - Joinder as a matter of UCCJEA law 
When Petitioner/Appellee failed to give "notice to" and "service" of the hearing that 
she and/or her attorney attended and took place on November 24, 2003, fact 
IV.A. 5 (see addendum "f\ transcript), including the failure to serve and give notice 
of written arguments (see addendum "g", letter), letter dated November 20, 2003, 
sent to "The Honorable Helen L. Halpert", and then was forward and submitted via 
"faxed* to the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck at the Third District Court, thus creating a 
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before, during and after one sided ex-parte hearing and argument (listed as a matter of 
law, above argument 2 and 3, UCA 108 and UCA 110). 
Wherefore, the Third District Court failed to notice serve or allow the 
Respondent/Appellant the opportunity to fully present facts, and fairly argue against the 
Petitioner/Appellee's ex-parte oral and written argumejit before a decision and/or 
determination on jurisdiction was made, thus the Third District Court ruling and order of 
this case to is not be entitled to full faith and credit as a matter of laws under the 
governing UCCJEA PKPA § 1738A(e), and as stated with Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-205 
(1)(3)(UCA205), Washington RCW 26.27.241 (1)(3) (which are verbatim with both 
states statutes) Notice - Opportunity to be heard - Joinder 
(1) "Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard ..." 
And specifically stated as a matter of laws within the NCCUSL final draft, page 31 of 
55, under prefatory note, it states this leading comment regarding section 205 
(addendum "b"): " Parents whose parental rights have not been previously terminated 
and persons having physical custody of the child are specifically mentioned as persons 
who must be given notice. The PKPA, § 1738A(e), requires that they be given notice in 
order for the custody determination to be entitled to full faith and credit under that Act " 
Emphasis added. 
As an act of bad faith, the Petitioner/Appellee and the Third District Court failed to give 
notice to the Respondent/Appellant, regarding fact IV. A. 5, and related arguments IV- 2, 
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3 and 4 listed above. Furthermore, the Third District Court failed to allow the 
Respondent/Appellant an opportunity to be heard, regarding fact IV.A.5, and related 
arguments 2, 3 and 4 above, before this cases child custody determination on jurisdiction 
was made in its ruling and order, whereby these failures violated the 
Respondent/Appellant's rights to due process as a matter of law under UCA 205. 
Therefore, under this chapter, and as a matter of UCCJEA UCA 205, and the PKPA § 
1738A(e) law, foil faith and credit can not be given to the Third District Courts ruling 
and order, because as an action of bad faith, it failed to give notice or the opportunity to 
be heard, thus, violating the Respondents/Appellent rights to due process. 
Issue Number Five 
V. Issue: Jurisdiction Declined By Reason Of Conduct, ILCA. 78-45c-208, 
(UCA 208) 
V.A - 1. Jurisdiction Declined By Reason Of Conduct as a matter of UCCJEA law 
This argument pertains to the Petitioner/Appellee bad faith unjustified conduct that 
"invokes the jurisdiction of the court59, and where it "applies to those situations where 
jurisdiction exists because of the unjustified conduct of die" Petitioner/Appellee "seeking 
to invoke it"" 
Above item V.A.1, is an excerpt of the context within the Respondent/Appellant's 
Memorandum In Support To Decline Petitioners Motion To Quash; Service Of 
Summons (addendum "e"). Pages 18 through 25 list the entire fact relating to Utah 
Code Section 78-45c-208 (UCA 208). Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. Un-
justifiable conduct is specifically stated as a matter of laws within the NCCUSL final 
draft, page 36 and 37 of 55, under prefatory note, states this leading comment regarding 
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section 208 (see addendum "b"): 
"Since there is no longer a multiplicity of jurisdictions which could take cognizance of a 
child-custody proceeding, there is less of a concern that one parent will take the child to 
another jurisdiction in an attempt to find a more favorable forum. Most of the 
jurisdictional problems generated by abducting parents should be solved by the 
prioritization of home State in Section 201; the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
provisions of Section 202; and the ban on modification in Section 203. " Emphasis 
added. But further states: 
" This section ensures that abducting parents will not receive an advantage for their 
unjustifiable conduct. If the conduct that creates the jurisdiction is unjustified, courts 
must decline to exercise jurisdiction that is inappropriately invoked by one of the parties. 
Emphasis added. And concludes with: 
"The attorney's fee standard for this section is patterned after the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S. C. § 11607(b)(3). The assessed costs and fees are to be 
paid to the respondent who established that jurisdiction was based on unjustifiable 
conduct." Emphasis added. 
The Petitioner/Appellee acted in bad faith with her unjustifiable conduct of filling her 
Utah "Motion to Quash Service of Summon", additional motion in Washington State, 
committed fraud, miss-represented herself, failed prioritized and present jurisdictional 
evidentiary fact, evidence, and arguments. 
The Third District Court should have from the on set of this case denied 
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Petitioners/Appellee's Motion to Quash Service of Summon based on the matter of 
UCCJEA law as an unjustifiable conduct under UCA 208, and further held the 
Petitioner/Appellee accountable for these actions and fine her for all and/or other relief, at 
law and in equity, to which Respondent/Appellant should have been, and still is justly 
entitled to. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the following case references apply to all issues listed as, I, n, III, IV and V. (see 
addendum V , for the full context of reference): 
Kingdon v. Kingdon, filed October 2, 2003, (2003 UT App. 326) Case No. 20020631-
CA, Determining Jurisdiction over custody matters is a question of law. See, e.g. In re 
D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Dragoo v. Dragoo, 298 N.W.2d 
231, ^ 232 (1980)). 
In re Brilliat, No. 08-01-00054-CV, Court of appeals of Texas, Eighth District. El Paso, 
86 S.W.3d 680; 2002 Tex. App. Lexis 4390, June 20, 2002, Decided, Released for 
Publication October 7, 2002. 
The Respondent/Appellant was doing right by filing his June 30,2003 Petition To 
Modify the parties Decree of Divorce, whereby asking help of the Third District Court in 
stabilizing the Petitioner/Appellee 8 move in 5 years, and to further stabilize the well fair 
(best interest) of the minor child for being move to a difference school every year of her 
life. The motive behind the Petitioner/Appellee filing her Motion to Quash Service of 
Summons (see course of proceedings, page iii) was to deliberately obstruct and/or stop 
the Respondent/Appellant Petition Modify, and to "receive an advantage" of her ongoing 
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unjustifiable conduct. The Petitioner/Appellee inexcusable conduct continued again this 
pastyear. While this case has been in the appeal process, the Petitioner/Appellee once 
again moved ihe parties minor child and pull her out of school for the last mouth of the 
school year (May 2003). Whereby this move was not, or could not have been challenged 
by the Respondent/Appellant do to the jurisdiction limbo cause by the Third District 
Courts wrongful actions of this case. 
The following further summarizes the unjustifiable acts of the Petitioner/Appellee. 
In this case, the Petitioner/Appellee 
1) acted in bad faith for filing her Motion To Quash Service of Summons. 
2) miss-represented the fact, evidence, and argument of this case 
3) committed fraud to the State of Utah and Washington 
4) act in bad faith with the un-justifiable conduct of filing simultaneous proceeding in 
two State. 
5) failed to prioritize and/or use evidentiary standards in this proceedings. 
6) failed to give notice to Respondent/Appellant 
7) force an ex-parte hearing with the Utah and Washington courts 
8) acted in bad faith by way of forum shopping the State of Washington 
9) demanded un-necessary communications with two courts 
10) committed bad faith collusion with the courts of Utah and Washington States 
In this case, the Third District Court abused its discretion in 
1) elevating its local powers to a status superior to the Federal Rules of PKPA 
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2) acted in bad faith by ignoring Utah non-uniform UCA 101 chapter 
3) committing fraud to the State of Washington by way of selling under false pretenses 
4) failure to follow standard due process procedures 
5) discriminated and disenfranchised a Utah citizen 
6) failed to prioritize and/or use evidentiary standards in this UCCJEA proceedings. 
7) ignored jurisdictional standards 
8) ignored Simultaneous proceeding where, and still are occurring 
9) ignored ex-parte hearing where occurring, and/or stopping the hearing in progress 
10) failed to allow the Respondent/Appellent an opportunity to be heard 
11) disregarding the effects of his action has on the parties jurisdictional stability 
12) allowed the Petitioner/Appellee to forum shop a jurisdiction to her liking 
13) subverted and circumvented UCCJEA law and evidentiary standards 
14) failed to familiarize him-self with the parties case file and jurisdictional evidence 
15) and, committed the unlawful conduct and bad faith act of collusion with the following 
persons and/or law firms: Petitioner/Appellee, attorneys for the Petitioner/Appellee 
Nancy Mismash and Scott T. Poston of TeschGraham P.C. Park City, Utah, attorney for 
the Petitioner/Appellee Henry R. Hanssen Jr. of the law office's of Inslee, Best, Doezie & 
Ryder, P.S. Bellevue Washington, and the Honorable Judge Helen L. Halpert of the 
Superior Court of the State of Washington for the County of King. Whereby the action 
of those who participated in the inappropriate and unlawfully conducted of collusion 
violated as a matter of law, federal and state constitution due process procedure, 
including fraud, miss-representation, and discrimination rights against the 
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Respondent/Appellent in this case. 
Justice demands that the Respondent/Appellant have returned to him the jurisdiction that 
was unlawfully relinquish from Utah, and for this Utah Court of Appeals to determine 
proper award of fees and costs due in the recovery of the parties Utah jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent/Appellant request that the Third District Court's ruling and order be reversed 
and retain the parties jurisdiction under Utah law. 
Respondent/Appellant request that the this Utah Court of Appeals and/or the Third 
District Court*s acknowledge the bad faith action of the Petitioner/Appellee and further 
ordered her to monetary reimbursed the Respondent/Appellant for time and expenses 
incurred in defending simultaneous proceeding in the State of Utah, and Washington 
including this appeal, as allowed by law, or in the alternative that this mater be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings before the district court, and for all other relief, at 
law and in equity, to which Respondent/Appellant may be justly entitled. 
DATED this <L ^\y day of <^<~&r<£*xV&L , 2004 
Respectfully submitted; 
David 
Respondent/^ 
P.O. Box 942 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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